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Converging lines of evidence from diverse research domains suggest that the left and right
hemispheres play distinct, yet complementary, roles in inferential reasoning. Here, we
review research on split-brain patients, brain-damaged patients, delusional patients, and
healthy individuals that suggests that the left hemisphere tends to create explanations,
make inferences, and bridge gaps in information, while the right hemisphere tends to
detect conflict, update beliefs, support mental set-shifts, and monitor and inhibit behavior.
Based on this evidence, we propose that the left hemisphere specializes in creating
hypotheses and representing causality, while the right hemisphere specializes in evaluating
hypotheses, and rejecting those that are implausible or inconsistent with other evidence. In
sum, we suggest that, in the domain of inferential reasoning, the left hemisphere strives
to reduce uncertainty while the right hemisphere strives to resolve inconsistency. The
hemispheres’ divergent inferential reasoning strategies may contribute to flexible, complex
reasoning in the healthy brain, and disruption in these systems may explain reasoning
deficits in the unhealthy brain.
Keywords: reasoning, split-brain, lateralization, delusions, inference making
INTRODUCTION
Hemispheric specialization has become a widely accepted prin-
ciple of cortical organization. For higher-order association areas
such as the prefrontal cortex (PFC), this is probably both a
consequence of the hemispheric specialization of the lower-
order regions that constitute the predominant inputs to these
regions (Craig, 2005), and also a response to the evolutionary
pressure against redundant functionality given limited corti-
cal space (Corballis, 1989; Gazzaniga, 2000; Vallortigara, 2006;
Hopkins and Cantalupo, 2008). However, most previous theories
of hypothesis formation and evaluation have focused on other
topographical distinctions—for example, between the dorsal and
ventral lateral regions of the PFC (Barbey and Patterson, 2011).
Here, we present evidence drawn from multiple distinct domains
and a variety of experimental paradigms to demonstrate that
the right and left hemispheres have distinctive strengths and
weaknesses in inferential reasoning.
Several distinct lines of evidence indicate that each hemisphere
plays a unique role in inference making. Perhaps the strongest
line of evidence comes from Michael Gazzaniga’s split-brain work,
which provides a unique view into the operation of each hemi-
sphere in isolation. Research on patients with unilateral brain
damage also sheds light on the sufficiency and necessity of each
hemisphere for various processes. Additionally, some psychiatric
conditions that involve failures in inference making have been
linked to hemispheric differences; delusions in particular reveal a
strong link between hemispheric changes and aberrant reasoning.
And finally, within the last two decades, cognitive neuroscience
research using largely healthy populations has provided substan-
tially more insight into some of the various component processes
that comprise successful inferential reasoning.
In this review, we describe and categorize hemispheric biases in
inferential reasoning. Although we may discuss each hemisphere
as a whole, we acknowledge that reasoning strategies arise from
processing biases in one or many of the specialized modules
that make up each hemisphere. That is, the properties of the
localized neural processes in each hemisphere combine to create
divergent reasoning strategies at the hemispheric level but may
not generalize to all modules in the hemisphere. Although this
localized processing view is more accurate, at times we simply
refer to each hemisphere, rather than the neural processes that
comprise it, for the sake of brevity.
This review is structured to highlight the dominant contri-
butions of each hemisphere in inferential reasoning. The first
two sections describe the various processes that each hemi-
sphere excels at. We do not have separate sections highlighting
each hemisphere’s weaknesses, because unless noted otherwise,
the hemispheres act as foils for one another—the strengths of
one hemisphere constitute the weaknesses of the other. Taken
together, there is a common thread that ties together the unique
abilities of each hemisphere, which we further develop into a
qualitative theory for how the two hemispheres work together
to perform inferential reasoning in the intact brain. To preview,
there is substantial evidence that the left hemisphere tends to form
hypotheses and the right hemisphere tends to evaluate and revise
them.
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Although a great deal of evidence from a broad cross-section of
the psychological literature is consistent with this framework, we
are careful to highlight those studies whose results contradict our
hypotheses. There are also a number of issues that obfuscate this
area of research, which we discuss in a final section on problems
and challenges.
LEFT HEMISPHERE PROCESSES
EXPLANATION
Ample evidence suggests that the left hemisphere creates
explanations when faced with uncertainty or ambiguity, and
split-brain studies offer especially salient examples of the left
hemisphere’s proclivity to explain (Gazzaniga, 1989, 2000). In
split-brain patients, the corpus callosum—the large bundle of
axons connecting the two hemispheres—is severed as a treatment
for intractable epilepsy. Since the two hemispheres of a split-
brain patient are disconnected and independent of one another,
researchers can study the cognitive abilities of each hemisphere in
isolation.
In one well-known experiment, a split-brain patient’s left
hemisphere was shown a picture of a chicken claw and his
right hemisphere was shown a picture of a snow scene. The
patient was asked to point to a card that was associated with
the picture he just saw. With his left hand (controlled by his
right hemisphere) he selected a shovel, which matched the snow
scene. With his right hand (controlled by his left hemisphere)
he selected a chicken, which matched the chicken claw. Next,
the experimenter asked the patient why he selected each item.
One would expect the speaking left hemisphere to explain why
it chose the chicken but not why it chose the shovel, since the left
hemisphere did not have access to information about the snow
scene. Instead, the patient’s speaking left hemisphere replied,
“Oh, that’s simple. The chicken claw goes with the chicken and
you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed” (Gazzaniga,
2000). The left hemisphere quickly and confidently created an
explanation for the behavior—an explanation that was incorrect
but nonetheless plausible, given the left hemisphere’s limited
information. In another experiment, researchers instructed the
right hemisphere of a split-brain patient to stand. After the
patient stood, experimenters asked the patient why he did so.
Again, instead of admitting that he did not know why he stood,
the speaking left hemisphere created an explanation, insisting
he was thirsty and wanted a drink (see Gazzaniga and Miller,
2009).
In these cases, the patients’ left hemispheres created explana-
tions that adequately accounted for their behaviors. Even though
the explanations were wrong, they were rational and plausible,
given the available evidence. When evidence is sparse or unusual,
however, the left hemisphere may create seemingly bizarre and
implausible explanations, which may develop into delusions.
Delusions are defined as “fixed beliefs that are not amenable
to change in light of conflicting evidence” (American Psychi-
atric Association, 2013). Coltheart et al. propose that delusions
arise when (1) aberrant evidence prompts an explanation; and
(2) an evaluative system fails to reject implausible explanations
(Coltheart, 2010; Coltheart et al., 2010, 2011). Delusions may
also arise when the left hemisphere’s tendency to explain goes
awry; indeed, delusional disorders are characterized by excessive
inference making (Braun and Suffren, 2011) and the tendency to
prematurely jump to conclusions (Huq et al., 1988; Dudley et al.,
1997; Conway et al., 2002; Moritz and Woodward, 2005; Warman
et al., 2007). Importantly, delusions have consistently been linked
to both right hemisphere damage (Devinsky, 2009; Coltheart,
2010; Braun and Suffren, 2011) and left hemisphere overactivity
(Leutmezer et al., 2003; Mucci et al., 2005; cf Luat et al., 2008;
Braun and Suffren, 2011). Together, these lines of evidence suggest
that the left hemisphere creates explanations that best account for
available data. The left hemisphere’s ability to explain, however,
is only as good as the information it receives: if it reasons with
incomplete or ambiguous evidence, it may create explanations
that are incorrect, inappropriate, or even bizarre (Cooney and
Gazzaniga, 2003).
Research on healthy subjects also indicates that the left hemi-
sphere plays a prominent role in explanation. Parris et al. (2009)
recorded subjects’ brain activity with fMRI as they watched
videos of magic tricks and control videos, which had the same
beginning as the magic trick videos but ended with either an
expected or unrelated surprising event. They found that only
the left dorsolateral PFC was more active when subjects viewed
magic tricks than when they viewed expected or surprising
events. As the researchers concluded, this increased activity
may reflect the left hemisphere’s attempt to explain the magic
trick.
FILLING IN GAPS
The left hemisphere appears to detest uncertainty; it creates
explanations and fills in gaps of information in order to build
a cohesive story and extinguish doubt. That is, in addition
to constructing an explanatory hypothesis for the evidence it
encounters, the left hemisphere seems to spontaneously gen-
erate predictions in accordance with its hypothesis (note that
while this is consistent with the increasingly popular notion
that the brain is fundamentally a prediction engine (e.g., Bar,
2007), we are limiting our scope here to inferential reasoning).
This propensity to fill in gaps may become excessive and lead
to errors in reasoning. Goel et al. (2007) found that the left
hemisphere can correctly form simple inferences, but tends to
over interpret ambiguous relationships: it draws conclusions with
incomplete information and infers relationships where there are
none.
The left hemisphere’s tendency to fill in gaps is also apparent
in recognition memory tests. The left hemisphere often creates
errors of commission—it falsely remembers seeing items that
were not presented before (Phelps and Gazzaniga, 1992; Metcalfe
et al., 1995; Braun, 2007; Braun et al., 2009; but cf. Stuss and
Alexander, 2007). Phelps and Gazzaniga (1992) presented visual
scenes with a common theme to split-brain patients and later
tested each hemisphere’s memory for the scenes. During the
recognition test, the left hemisphere falsely remembered scenes
that were not present in the study phase, but that fit the gist of
the presented scenes. The right hemisphere, on the other hand,
demonstrated a veridical memory for the scenes. Again, the results
suggest that the left hemisphere bridged semantic gaps, which led
to the false recognition of items that fit a schema or gist.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 839 | 2
Marinsek et al. Hemispheric lateralization of inferential reasoning
Studies on discourse comprehension and inference making in
language also suggest the left hemisphere bridges semantic gaps.
Specifically, the left hemisphere has been shown to draw coher-
ence inferences, or contextually relevant connections between
intermediately related material. Lesion studies show that patients
with right hemisphere damage retain the ability to draw coherence
inferences (Tompkins et al., 2004; but cf. Beeman, 1993, which
reports mixed results). Similarly, several neuroimaging studies
have reported left-dominant activity specifically when partici-
pants draw bridging inferences, or encounter information that
is only intermediately related to context (Kuperberg et al., 2006;
Virtue et al., 2006; Friese et al., 2008). Finally, priming studies
in healthy individuals supports left hemisphere (to a numerically
larger degree than right hemisphere) involvement in inferencing
(Beeman et al., 2000; Powers et al., 2012, for narratives but not
conversations).
INFERENCE MAKING
Patients with an intact left hemisphere, but damaged right hemi-
sphere, retain the ability to make simple inferences about hypo-
thetical situations (Deglin and Kinsbourne, 1996; Caplan and
Dapretto, 2001; Ferstl et al., 2002; Goel et al., 2007; Reverberi
et al., 2009). Neuroimaging studies using healthy participants
also implicate the left hemisphere in inference making: left-
lateralized brain networks have been identified for tasks involving
interpreting and reasoning about past events (D’Argembeau et al.,
2013), making inferences about related sentences (Ferstl and
von Cramon, 2002; Friese et al., 2008), and inferring a rule or
relationship (Rodriguez-Moreno and Hirsch, 2009).
Additionally, only the left hemisphere can infer causal rela-
tionships between two objects: Gazzaniga and Smylie (1984)
presented object pairs to one hemisphere of split-brain patients
and asked the patients to point to a picture that depicted the
outcome of combining the two objects with their contralateral
hand. For example, if pictures of a match and wooden log
were presented to the left hemisphere, the patient could point
to a bonfire (the correct causal outcome), a woodpile, or a lit
cigarette with their right hand. Even though both hemispheres
possessed a sophisticated lexicon, only the left hemisphere could
infer the causal relationship between the two items, and this
trend held for both visual and verbal stimuli. The left hemi-
sphere, but not the right, can also use evidence to extract
an underlying causal structure (Roser et al., 2005) and may
attempt to do so, even when events are random (Wolford et al.,
2000).
RIGHT HEMISPHERE PROCESSES
CONFLICT DETECTION
The right hemisphere plays a prominent role in detecting
inconsistencies between hypotheses and reality. Patients with
an intact right hemisphere, but damaged or suppressed left
hemisphere, retain the ability to identify semantic incon-
sistencies (Ferstl et al., 2002) and detect conflict between
logic and real-world knowledge (Deglin and Kinsbourne,
1996).
Neuroimaging studies using healthy and deluded individuals
also suggest the right hemisphere detects conflict. Studies on
healthy subjects consistently find that the right lateral PFC is
recruited when logic conflicts with prior beliefs (Goel et al.,
2000; Goel and Dolan, 2003; Goel, 2007; Menenti et al., 2009;
Stollstorff et al., 2012) and its activity is modulated by the degree
to which reasoning problems conflict with real-world knowledge
(Stollstorff et al., 2012). Regions in the right hemisphere are also
active when subjects receive negative feedback indicating that
their hypothesis is no longer correct (Konishi et al., 2002).
Returning to the topic of delusions, these disordered pat-
terns of thinking are characterized not only by excessive infer-
ence making, but also the failure to evaluate and update beliefs
in accordance with conflicting evidence (Marcel et al., 2004;
Coltheart, 2010; Coltheart et al., 2010, 2011). It is possible
that the failure to update inappropriate beliefs results from an
impaired conflict detection system. In one study, Corlett et al.
(2007) taught delusional patients and controls associative map-
pings between foods and allergic outcomes. After the participants
learned the mappings thoroughly, the researchers gave subjects
negative feedback that contradicted the mappings they were
taught. In healthy controls, the right ventrolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (vlPFC) demonstrated a reward-prediction error: relative to
baseline, its activity increased in response to unexpected feedback
and decreased in response to expected feedback. The right vlPFC
of delusional patients, however, failed to distinguish between
expected and unexpected feedback, suggesting the delusional
patients’ prediction-error processing was impaired.
HYPOTHESIS REJECTION
The right hemisphere may also support the rejection of inap-
propriate beliefs and hypotheses. When the right hemisphere
is damaged, patients’ hypotheses become rigid and imper-
meable to conflicting evidence. In one experiment, Brownell
et al. (1986) showed patients with unilateral right hemisphere
brain damage two sentences that could be integrated to form
one interpretation. Importantly, one of the two sentences sup-
ported a different, incorrect interpretation when presented in
isolation. Brownell manipulated the position of the mislead-
ing sentence to test the patients’ ability to revise an initial
incorrect hypothesis. Compared to controls, patients with right
hemisphere brain damage made fewer correct inferences. They
could accurately extract true causal relationships but tended
to make inappropriate associations between non-related items.
Patients’ erroneous inferences were especially prevalent when
the misleading information was presented first. These find-
ings suggest that a functioning right hemisphere is neces-
sary to detect inconsistencies and update flawed hypotheses
accordingly.
In a similar study, Miller et al. (2010) presented moral
reasoning problems to split-brain patients. The problems con-
sisted of scenarios that featured characters with either cruel or
helpful intentions and outcomes that were either harmful or
neutral. Their results are consistent with the idea that the split-
brain patients’ left hemispheres formed quick-and-dirty infer-
ences when presented with initial evidence about the scenario
(the potential danger of the situation), and these inferences were
resistant to revision when additional evidence about the char-
acters’ intentions was provided. This suggests that, without the
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right hemisphere’s ability to reject inappropriate or improbable
hypotheses when contradictory evidence arises, the left hemi-
sphere maintains its original explanations, even if they are no
longer relevant.
Research on delusional patients also strongly implicates the
right hemisphere in belief evaluation and revision. As we
have noted previously, delusions persist because patients fail to
update inappropriate beliefs (Marcel et al., 2004; Coltheart, 2010;
Coltheart et al., 2010, 2011) and this failure is rooted in right
hemisphere brain damage (Stone et al., 1993; Ramachandran,
1996; Devinsky, 2009; Coltheart, 2010; Coltheart et al., 2010,
2011; Braun and Suffren, 2011). Marcel et al. (2004) examined the
beliefs of 64 patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (denial of
paralysis), 44 of whom had unilateral right hemisphere damage
and 22 of whom had unilateral left hemisphere damage. They
found that patients with right hemisphere lesions, but not so
much those with left hemisphere lesions, consistently overesti-
mated their abilities to perform tasks requiring the use of their
paralyzed limbs. Moreover, only patients with right hemisphere
brain damage continued to overestimate their ability to per-
form a task after they had just failed to perform the task in
question.
Coltheart et al. (2010) review cases of patients with neuro-
logical symptoms that mirror those of delusional patients, but
who nonetheless fail to develop delusional beliefs. They propose
that these patients, unlike delusional patients, have an intact right
frontal lobe, which allows them to reject implausible hypothe-
ses and update their beliefs in accordance with reality. In a
particularly striking example in support of this view, Bisiach
et al. (1991) temporarily increased activity in the right hemi-
sphere of a patient who believed her left arm belonged to her
mother by irrigating her left ear with cold water. Incredibly, the
irrigation abolished the patient’s delusion: up to 2 h after the
procedure, she rightfully claimed her arm as her own. This finding
has since been replicated (Ramachandran, 1996) and supports
the necessity of the right hemisphere in updating inappropriate
beliefs.
MENTAL SET SHIFTING
In a similar vein to belief updating, the right hemisphere has
been shown to support mental set shifts. Cools et al. (2002)
showed that the right vlPFC is active during the last trial before
a hypothesis switch in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST)
and this activity is independent of the receipt of negative feedback
(but cf. Konishi et al., 2002, who found left-lateralized activations
for WCST set-shifting). Right hemisphere hypometabolism has
also been linked to greater perseveration in the WCST (Lombardi
et al., 1999; but cf. Stuss et al., 2000; Stuss and Alexander, 2007,
who show perseveration in patient groups with both right and
left hemisphere damage). Although there is mixed evidence, these
results may suggest that the right hemisphere supports the shift
from one hypothesis to another. If so, right hemisphere damage
may cause beliefs to become fixed and immune to subsequent
negative feedback.
Goel and Vartanian (2005) also highlight the role of the
right vlPFC in set-shifting. They gave subjects problems that
required the subjects to undergo lateral transformations—mental
movements “from one state in a problem space to a horizontally
displaced state rather than a more detailed version of the same
state”—to correctly solve the problems (Goel and Vartanian,
2005, p. 1170). Based on the neuroimaging results and previ-
ous research, they concluded the right vlPFC initiates lateral
transformations.
The importance of the right hemisphere in shifting from one
mental set to another is also apparent in real-world tasks; Goel
et al. (2013) asked patients with unilateral brain lesions to plan
a trip to Italy and found that right hemisphere brain damaged
patients made inferior plans compared with other patients and
controls. Goel et al. (2013, p. 721) attribute the patients’ poor
planning to substandard mental set shifting: “Damage to the
right PFC system impairs the encoding and processing of more
abstract and vague representations that facilitate lateral transfor-
mations. This results in prematurely locking onto precise concrete
patterns, and quickly drawing conclusions, albeit substandard
ones”.
MONITORING AND INHIBITION
Outside the domains of reasoning and hypothesis making, the
right hemisphere has been shown to play a general role in mon-
itoring and inhibiting thoughts and behavior. Chatham et al.
(2012) and Stuss and Alexander (2007) review evidence that
suggests that the right hemisphere, and specifically the right
vlPFC, plays a role in context monitoring. Aron et al. (2014)
propose that the right vlPFC serves as a brake to inhibit task-
irrelevant behavior. Together, these general findings suggest that
the right hemisphere monitors the environment for inconsisten-
cies or goal-irrelevant stimuli and inhibits behaviors or thoughts
that interfere with the goal at hand.
DIVERGENT HEMISPHERIC TENDENCIES IN REASONING
Based on the evidence presented above, we propose that the left
and right hemispheres play different, yet complementary, roles in
inferential reasoning. Evidence suggests that the left hemisphere
tends to create inferences and explanations to resolve uncertainty.
As Gazzaniga suggested over two decades ago, the left hemisphere
is an interpreter (Gazzaniga, 1989). Its propensity to explain
resembles abductive inference, or inference to the best explana-
tion (Coltheart et al., 2010); its inferences do not necessarily have
to be correct, or even plausible in some cases, as long as they
bridge gaps in information and create a cohesive story. When
free from the reign of an evaluative right hemisphere, the left
hemisphere’s inferences may become excessive or inappropriate,
and may fail to account for all contradictory evidence. How-
ever, this is not to say that the left hemisphere always makes
poor explanations. Indeed, it seems as if the quality of the left
hemisphere’s inferences is commensurate to the quality of the
evidence it reasons with; most of the time, the left hemisphere’s
inferences are sound and effectively reduce the uncertainty of the
environment.
Unlike the left hemisphere, the right hemisphere, in our
view, places a premium on the truth. It is sensitive to conflicts
between hypotheses and real-world knowledge. In line with its
roles in belief updating and set-shifting, we propose that the
right hemisphere (1) monitors the plausibility of hypotheses and;
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(2) jettisons explanations that are inconsistent with reality or new
evidence. Thus, the right hemisphere may prompt the revision of
inappropriate hypotheses and initiate the search for new ones.
In the realm of hypothesis making, if the left hemisphere is
considered an interpreter, the right hemisphere may be considered
a realist. While the left hemisphere strives to reduce uncertainty,
the right hemisphere strives to reduce inconsistencies between
hypotheses and reality.
Our conceptualizations of the left hemisphere as an interpreter
and the right hemisphere as a realist are akin to Ramachan-
dran’s distinction between left and right hemispheric tendencies
(Ramachandran, 1996). According to Ramachandran, “The left
hemisphere’s job is to create a model and maintain it at all costs.
The right hemisphere’s strategy, on the other hand, is fundamen-
tally different. I like to call it the ‘anomaly detector’, for when
the anomalous information reaches a certain threshold, the right
hemisphere decides that it is time to force the left hemisphere
to revise the entire model and start from scratch” (pp. 351–352).
These divergent tendencies to maintain vs. overhaul existing mod-
els are similar to Piaget’s concepts of assimilation (the propen-
sity to integrate information into existing models) and accom-
modation (the propensity to modify existing models to better
reflect reality) (Piaget, 1976). Although Piaget did not make any
predictions concerning laterality, the evidence reviewed thus far
suggests that the left hemisphere gravitates toward assimilation
whereas the right hemisphere gravitates toward accommoda-
tion. Once the left hemisphere adopts a model that minimizes
uncertainty and maximizes explanatory power, it incorporates
new evidence into the model and may rationalize, ignore, or
deny any contradictory evidence (Ramachandran, 1996). This
“band-aid approach” creates a patchwork of explanations and
rationalizations, but effectively reduces uncertainty by doing so.
Unlike the left hemisphere, the neural processes clustered in
the right hemisphere are sensitive to contradictions between
beliefs and evidence. When contradictory evidence arises, the
right hemisphere may prompt the reworking of the model to
satisfy the new evidence or may suppress attempts at explana-
tion altogether—in its view, it is better to be uncertain than
wrong.
A study by Deglin and Kinsbourne (1996) offers a striking
example of the hemispheres’ divergent reasoning strategies. In
their experiment, patients undergoing electroconvulsive therapy
(ECT) were shown two premises with familiar or unfamiliar
content and were asked if a given conclusion supported or
contradicted the premises. For example, patients were given the
premises “Every state has a flag. Zambia is a state” and were
asked “Does Zambia have a flag, or not?” Each patient completed
the task on three separate occasions: once after ECT was used
to suppress activity in the left hemisphere, once after ECT was
used to suppress activity in the right hemisphere, and once before
receiving ECT (which served as a control condition). Incredibly,
even though the same syllogisms were presented to the same
patients, the patients’ responses differed wildly depending on
which hemisphere was suppressed. When patients’ right hemi-
spheres were suppressed (and their left hemispheres were spared),
their responses were consistent with the logic of the syllogism—
even when the logic conflicted the patients’ beliefs and when the
material was unfamiliar—and the patients responded faster and
with more confidence, as compared to the control condition. In
contrast, when the left hemisphere was suppressed (and the right
hemisphere was spared) the patients tended to give responses
that were consistent with real-world prior knowledge. Further-
more, if the premises contradicted real-world knowledge or were
unfamiliar, the patients questioned the premises, answered with
uncertainty, or refused to answer at all. For example, when pre-
sented with the Zambia syllogism, the same subject responded,
“Each state has a flag, Zambia has also” under right hemisphere
suppression but “Who knows it, this Zambia, how can I know
whether it has a flag or not?” under left hemisphere suppression.
This research supports our proposal of different hemispheric
tendencies in reasoning: the left hemisphere readily makes infer-
ences, regardless of content or conflicting evidence, and the
right hemisphere ensures that conclusions are consistent with
reality.
CONGRUENCE WITH OTHER HEMISPHERIC LATERALIZATION THEORIES
Our framework is compatible with broader, more general the-
ories of hemispheric lateralization. Bowden et al. (2005) pro-
pose that the hemispheres differ in the granularity of their
computations and these differences produce distinct cognitive
strategies and capabilities. Specifically, they suggest that compu-
tations in the right hemisphere are more coarsely tuned than
those of the left hemisphere, an idea supported by the finding
that the right hemisphere is more interconnected—on both a
cellular and systems level—than the left hemisphere (Bowden
et al., 2005). The relative coarse coding of the right hemisphere
and relative fine coding of the left hemisphere would make the
hemispheres predisposed to global and local processing, respec-
tively. In the realm of inferential reasoning, the coarse, global
processing of the right hemisphere may facilitate the detection
of discrepancies between an explanation and its global, real-
world context. Conversely, the finer coding of the left hemi-
sphere may emphasize local cohesion at the expense of global
consistency.
Braun’s “psychic tonus” model of hemispheric specialization
is also consistent with our claim that the left hemisphere tends
to create inferences while the right hemisphere tends to monitor,
evaluate, and revise them (Braun, 2007). According to his model,
the left hemisphere generally activates mentation and behavior
while the right hemisphere inhibits them. More colloquially, the
left hemisphere is predisposed to “do something” and the right
hemisphere is inclined to “freeze and recoup” (Braun, 2007,
p. 418). The propensity of the left hemisphere to act and create
is consistent with our view that it plays a prominent role in
making inferences and bridging gaps in information. Likewise,
the right hemisphere’s tendency to inhibit behavior is in line with
our proposal that it plays a role in monitoring and inhibiting
inappropriate hypotheses.
In his review, Braun also suggests that the hemispheres act
in opposition to each other: the suppression of cognitive mod-
ules in one hemisphere activates their counterparts in the other
hemisphere and vice versa. Craig (2005) echoes the idea of
hemispheric opposition in his review of emotional asymmetry
and suggests that the balance between opposing hemispheric
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systems facilitates homeostasis and health. It is possible that hemi-
spheric opposition also plays a role in inferential reasoning; the
two hemispheric reasoning systems may compete during infer-
ence making and may be preferentially recruited in accordance
with situational demands. A dual reasoning system with oppo-
nent interactions could promote balanced and flexible inference
making. Moreover, disruption in the balance between the two
component systems may explain aberrant reasoning in brain-
damaged and delusional patients. In the case of right hemisphere
brain damage, an overactive left-lateralized reasoning system may
lead to excessive inference making. Conversely, a right-lateralized
reasoning system resulting from left hemisphere brain damage
may lead to insufficient inference making, as patient studies
suggest.
In his theory of hemispheric lateralization, Corballis (1989)
proposes that the left hemisphere is uniquely generative; that
is, it combines visual, lexical, or semantic elements to create
“novel assemblages” (p. 499). Corballis argues that the left hemi-
sphere’s capacity for language and visual image production is
rooted in its ability to create novel combinations. In the realm
of reasoning, the generativity of the left hemisphere could facil-
itate, or perhaps even underlie, inference making, since both
processes involve making new associations to create a cohesive
whole. Unlike the left hemisphere, Corballis suggests that the
right hemisphere uses an analog code of representation; that is,
its neural representations reflect reality and leave less room for
interpretation and manipulation. Again, the right hemisphere’s
tendency to represent items veridically is consistent with our view
that the right hemisphere values truth and consistency during
reasoning.
Finally, in their review of the functional anatomy of infer-
ential reasoning, Barbey and Patterson (2011) present evidence
that the vlPFC supports explanation generation, the dorsolat-
eral PFC supports explanation evaluation, and the anterior PFC
supports the integration of inferences. Although they did not
emphasize hemispheric specialization in the review, their meta-
analysis reveals a distinct hemispheric lateralization, such that the
left hemisphere supports hypothesis formation and integration
and the right hemisphere supports hypothesis evaluation. These
findings are consistent with our view that the left hemisphere
plays a prominent role in forming inferences and the right
hemisphere plays a prominent role in monitoring the validity of
inferences.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES
This review focused on higher-order inferential reasoning and
surveyed tasks involving reasoning problems that were com-
plicated and semantic in nature. In other domains of causal
inference making, such as comprehension or perception, the
left hemisphere vs. right hemisphere distinction we present here
may not hold. For example, although the left hemisphere is
generally superior at making judgments about causal structure,
the right hemisphere has been shown to skillfully make percep-
tual (Corballis, 2003; Miller and Valsangkar-Smyth, 2005; Roser
et al., 2005) and possibly social (Wende et al., 2013) causal
judgments and inferences. The right hemisphere may also play a
prominent role in processes related to inference making, such as
solving problems with insight (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003;
Kounios and Beeman, 2014) or comprehending natural language
(Jung-Beeman, 2005). However, it is possible that additional
constraints on each hemisphere, for which we currently have
only oblique evidence, might resolve some of these ambigui-
ties. For instance, the right hemisphere might value parsimony
to a greater degree than the left, and may therefore be more
likely to arrive at the correct solution in problems requiring
insight (or rather, less likely to arrive at convoluted, incorrect
solutions).
According to our claim that the right hemisphere monitors
the validity of inferences, a damaged or disconnected right hemi-
sphere should lead to implausible or excessive inference making
and possibly even delusions. However, split-brain patients and
some patients with unilateral right hemisphere brain damage
fail to develop delusional disorders (Gazzaniga, 2000; Coltheart,
2010). Coltheart’s two factor theory of delusions may offer an
explanation as to why split-brain patients and patients with
right hemisphere brain damage do not succumb to disorders in
reasoning. As we stated earlier, Coltheart proposes that delusions
require: (1) an impairment that elicits some sort of explana-
tion and; (2) a dysfunctional belief evaluation system that fails
to reject implausible explanations for the initial impairment
(McKay et al., 2007; Coltheart, 2010; Coltheart et al., 2010, 2011).
We suggest that split-brain patients and unilateral right brain-
damaged patients may meet the second requirement but not
the first. That is, these patients may have an impaired evalua-
tion system but they fail to develop delusional beliefs because
they lack a neurological impairment that warrants an explana-
tion. Right hemisphere damage or isolation may therefore make
a patient vulnerable to abnormal reasoning, but it does not
necessarily precipitate delusional ideation; in other words, left
hemisphere over-activity or right hemisphere under-activity is
necessary, but not sufficient, for delusions to form. It is also
likely that—although the right hemisphere plays a leading role
in hypothesis evaluation—the left hemisphere retains some eval-
uative capabilities, which may prevent delusional beliefs from
forming.
Although several lines of evidence support our framework,
some do not. Under our framework, the receipt of inconsistent
evidence should preferentially activate regions in the right hemi-
sphere, but Fugelsang and Dunbar (2005) found left-lateralized
activations in subjects who were presented with evidence that
conflicted a theory. Since this study utilized a block design,
however, it is possible that it failed to capture the true neural
activity associated with the presentation of contradictory evi-
dence; the left lateralized activations may instead reflect infer-
ential reasoning processes other than hypothesis evaluation and
belief updating. A study by Vartanian and Goel (2005) also
contradicts our predictions. They propose that the right vlPFC
supports unconstrained hypothesis generation, since they found
that activity in the right vlPFC increases as the constraints of
an anagram-solving task decrease. An alternative explanation
for their results could be that the right vlPFC plays a role in
monitoring the problem solving process or inhibiting unfruit-
ful lines of reasoning, both of which would fit within our
framework.
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The strongest evidence against our proposal stems from two
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies conducted by
Tsujii et al. (2010, 2011). In both studies, TMS was applied
to the left and right inferior frontal cortices of subjects prior
to a deduction task that involved belief-logic conflicts. Since
we postulate that the right hemisphere favors truth and real-
world knowledge over logic, we would expect inhibition of the
left vlPFC, but not the right vlPFC, to cause an over-reliance
on prior beliefs. Contrary to our predictions, they found that
right vlPFC disruption increased the influence of prior beliefs
on logic (thus enhancing the belief-bias effect) and left vlPFC
disruption eliminated the belief-bias effect. It is possible that
the right hemisphere’s role in reasoning is not only to monitor,
revise, and reject improbable hypotheses, as we have proposed,
but also to inhibit information that is irrelevant to reasoning. In
this case, disruption of an inhibitory right vlPFC would allow
conflicting prior beliefs to bias reasoning, thus enhancing the
belief-bias effect as Tsujii et al. (2010, 2011) found. Alternatively,
it is possible that the targeted brain regions were not modulated
as intended, even though the stimulation parameters used in
the studies have been shown to reduce cortical excitability in
motor cortex following stimulation (Robertson et al., 2003). In
any case, additional studies using complementary neuromodula-
tion techniques are needed to corroborate and expand on these
findings.
Finally, there are general caveats to interpreting evidence
from various lines of research. For instance, lesion and psy-
chiatric data come from studies of the abnormal brain, which
both adds additional noise (no two lesions are identical) and
gives room for a host of compensatory mechanisms to influ-
ence behavior. Conversely, neuroimaging fails to ascribe causality
to brain activity in any particular region—that is, given that
both hemispheres presumably process incoming events, higher
activity in one hemisphere than the other may simply reflect
additional effort (i.e., less efficient or effective processing) on
the part of the more active hemisphere, rather than its neces-
sity for performance. Carefully designed studies (that correlate
activity with accuracy, for instance) can help allay these con-
cerns. Neuroimaging studies may especially fail to shed light on
hemispheric lateralization: contrasts designed to find the neural
correlates of one process may be contaminated by the neural
fingerprints of another, which may in turn make a truly lateralized
process appear bilateral. We also necessarily make the neuroim-
ager’s fallacy (Poldrack et al., 2008) in almost every case, as the
vast majority of studies—even those that report lateralization
results—only report clusters of activation, not direct contrasts
across hemispheres.
DISCUSSION
In this review, we present converging lines of evidence from
research on split-brain, delusional, brain-damaged, and healthy
subjects that suggest the left hemisphere creates hypotheses and
the right hemisphere evaluates these hypotheses and rejects
them if they conflict with reality. Similarly, it appears the
left hemisphere is driven toward reducing uncertainty, and
does so by creating inferences to bridge information gaps,
and the right hemisphere is driven toward reducing conflict,
and does so by revising and rejecting explanations that are
inconsistent with reality. In a healthy human brain, these
divergent hemispheric tendencies complement each other and
create a balanced and flexible reasoning system. Working in
unison, the left and right hemispheres can create inferences
that have explanatory power and both internal and external
consistency.
FUNCTIONAL LOCALIZATION CONSIDERATIONS
So far we have only considered the lateralization of hypothesis for-
mation and evaluation. Although the specific functional localiza-
tion of these processes is outside the scope of this paper, we would
like to briefly comment on potential sites of hypothesis making in
the brain. Several studies indicate that the right lateral prefrontal
cortex, and more specifically the right vlPFC, is recruited during
hypothesis evaluation. Activity in the right vlPFC is associated
with effortful inhibition (Aron et al., 2014), detecting and resolv-
ing conflicts between beliefs and logic (Goel et al., 2000; Goel and
Dolan, 2003; Goel, 2007; Menenti et al., 2009; Stollstorff et al.,
2012), and rejecting inappropriate hypotheses in accordance with
new evidence (Cools et al., 2002). Conversely, the left vlPFC and
left dorsomedial PFC have been linked to hypothesis formation.
These areas are consistently activated during deduction (Goel
et al., 2000; Friese et al., 2008; Rodriguez-Moreno and Hirsch,
2009; Monti and Osherson, 2012) and have been shown to be
active during reasoning about autobiographical (D’Argembeau
et al., 2013) or social (Barbey and Patterson, 2011) events.
CONCLUSION
We would like to emphasize that we are proposing the hemi-
spheres have different reasoning propensities. We do not claim
these different reasoning styles generalize to all individuals and
all reasoning problems, nor do we claim that the processes we
discuss in this review are completely lateralized to one hemisphere
or the other. The right hemisphere may make inferences to
some extent (especially in certain cognitive domains) and the
left hemisphere may possess some evaluative capabilities. Indeed,
the facts that split-brain patients do not develop bizarre, patho-
logical beliefs and delusional patients occasionally experience
intermittent symptoms (Coltheart, 2010) suggest that hypothesis
formation and evaluation are not totally lateralized in the brain.
However, a large body of evidence suggests that the natural
reasoning tendencies and strategies of the hemispheres do differ.
Cognitive processes in the left hemisphere tend to make inferences
while those in the right hemisphere tend to detect and correct
inconsistencies. These findings are consistent and robust among
patient studies and, to some extent, among neuroimaging studies
using healthy participants.
Our framework offers several testable predictions. First,
neuroimaging studies using tasks that isolate hypothesis
formation or hypothesis evaluation should find increased
brain activity in the left and right hemispheres, respectively.
However, it may prove difficult to isolate the brain processes
underlying only one subcomponent of inferential reasoning
since healthy individuals naturally form, monitor, and evaluate
inferences concurrently. This may obfuscate attempts to
identify the neural basis of inferential reasoning processes
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and may make lateralized processes appear bilateral.
Neuromodulation with TMS or transcranial direct current
stimulation (tDCS) may provide a promising alternative. By
testing subjects’ reasoning abilities and shortcomings under
unilateral hemispheric suppression or stimulation, it may
be possible to determine the unique roles each hemisphere
plays in inferential reasoning. We predict subjects under
right hemisphere suppression (and perhaps left hemisphere
stimulation) will retain the ability to make inferences but
may be prone to accept implausible explanations. Conversely,
we predict subjects under left hemisphere suppression (and
perhaps right hemisphere stimulation) will retain the ability
to detect conflicts or inconsistencies in reasoning, but may
be impaired in making inferences and creating explanations.
We predict similar reasoning biases to be present in other
cases of hemispheric asymmetry in the frontal lobes (such as
functional asymmetries arising from neurological conditions,
pharmaceutical manipulations, or simply normal brain
development and aging). However, we expect that these
biases will be weaker and less consistent than those observed
in patients with brain damage or participants undergoing
neuromodulation since changes in hemispheric dominance may
be subtle and accompanied by a host of other neural changes and
compensatory mechanisms.
Lateralized processing in the brain is both prevalent and
beneficial: it maximizes the use of cortical space by reducing
redundancy (Corballis, 1989; Gazzaniga, 2000; Vallortigara, 2006;
Hopkins and Cantalupo, 2008), enhances brain efficiency by
supporting dual processing (Rogers, 2000; Rogers et al., 2004;
Vallortigara, 2006), reduces interhemispheric conflict by allowing
the hemispheres to operate in separate problem spaces (Corballis,
2003; Vallortigara, 2006), and increases processing speed (Ringo
et al., 1994). Hemispheric lateralization of inferential reason-
ing may be especially beneficial. Dual reasoning strategies—one
driven to reduce uncertainty and the other driven to resolve
inconsistency—create a flexible, efficient, and balanced reasoning
system. Cognitive modules in the left hemisphere, with their
propensities to create explanations, bridge gaps, and infer cau-
sation, may be preferentially recruited in situations that require
creativity and liberal inference making. Conversely, cognitive
modules in the right hemisphere, with their tendencies to detect
conflict, monitor explanations in a global context, and inhibit
inappropriate inferences, may play a greater role in situations that
necessitate caution and conservative reasoning. Simply biasing
these reasoning systems in accordance with situational demands
ensures reasoning is adaptive, sensible, and efficient. In a healthy
brain, the different inferential capabilities of the hemispheres
enhance reasoning by maximizing both explanatory power and
plausibility.
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